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HORN v. SETH
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH
REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS
Horn v. Seth'
The defendant appellant was sued by the plaintiff appel-
lee for intentional and unlawful interference with its obliga-
tion created by its contract to purchase real estate. Both the
plaintiff and the defendant are real estate brokers. A Mr.
and Mrs. B listed property for sale with the defendant on a
non-exclusive agency basis in 1946. In 1948 a sale having
not been made, the B's asked the plaintiff to procure a
purchaser, also on a non-exclusive basis. The plaintiff
showed the property to a Mr. and Mrs. L, who requested
that they be given until the evening of May 24 to make up
their minds. The B's approved this arrangement. On the
24th, the defendant showed the property to one Mr. T who
indicated an interest to purchase on that very day. The
owner went to the plaintiff to see if the L's were genuinely
interested. The plaintiff called L who orally agreed to take
the property for $12,500, the deposit to be made on that day
before 1 P.M. B, after being so informed, returned home
to find the defendant there. The defendant stated that T
had made an offer of $13,000, and that she further had a
deposit check for $1,000. At this time, L called B on the
telephone and during the conversation the owner informed
L that the price was now $13,000. L agreed to take it at
this price and the owner was satisfied. A few minutes
later, the owner called L and informed him that the price
had gone up to $13,500. L then called the plaintiff who in
turn informed the owner that he, the plaintiff, had a $500
deposit. This last phone call was made before 1 P.M. The
defendant was present during all these calls, had knowl-
edge of the agreement with the L's, and yet proceeded to in-
duce the owner to sell to T by offering to refund part of
her commission. The plaintiff brought action in tort against
the defendant for the unlawful interference with his con-
tractual right to the commission, electing not to sue the
B's for commission earned. The plaintiff got judgment and
the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. A
dissenting opinion2 was filed, representing the dissent of
two of the five judges.
This action for inducing a breach of contract as it now
exists is of comparatively modern origin. The action for
1 95 A. 2d 312 (Md., 1953).
1 Chief Judge Sobeloff, with whom was Judge Delaplaine.
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inducing a servant to breach a contract existed under the
early common law of England. Not until the decision in
Lumley v. Gye,3 in 1853, was it declared to be actionable to
"maliciously" procure another to breach a contract for per-
sonal services, although the relation of master and servant
did not exist. The term "malicious" when used to describe
interference does not mean actual malice or ill will, but the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social
justification.4 In Temperton v. Russell,5 decided in 1893,
the doctrine was extended and made applicable to contracts
generally. The courts of Maryland have accepted the doc-
trine and extended the law of torts to actions to recover
damages for unlawfully inducing the breach of contracts.
Today it is well settled that intentional and unlawful inter-
ference with obligations created by a contract, when such
contract is known to the interferer, is tortious6
In order for there to be such a tort, the first requirement
is the existence of a contractual relationship. Herein is
where the difficulty lies. The real question in this case
which split the Maryland Court of Appeals was whether or
not a contract actually existed. A close examination of the
facts reveals that the two brokers, each with their own re-
spective buyers, were actively bidding back and forth for
the property in question. This type of bargaining, such as
went on in this case, is not unheard of in the real estate
business.7 Here, the plaintiff and defendant were in active
rivalry and bargaining continued until a deposit was ac-
cepted. The Court felt that a contract to pay plaintiff the
commission came into being either when B agreed with the
8 2 E. & Bi. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Eng., 1853).
1 Cumberland Glass Manufacturing Co. v. DeWitt, 120 Md. 381, 87 A. 927(1913). A question can certainly be raised as to whether or not there was
social justification in the Horn v. Seth case.
51 Q. B. 715, 62 LJQB 200, 412 (Eng., 1893).
Stannard v. McCool, 84 A. 2d 862 (Md., 1951), and cases there cited.
'Goldman v. Building Assn., 150 Md. 677, 684, 685, 133 A. 843 (1926).
"'Iron sharpeneth iron' is ancient wisdom, and the law is in accord
in favoring free competition, since ordinarily it is essential to the
general welfare of society, notwithstanding competition is not altruistic
but is fundamentally the play of interest against Interest, and so in-
volves the interference of the successful competitor with the interest
of his unsuccessful competitor in the matter of their common rivalry.
Competition is the state in which men live and Is not a tort, unless the
nature of the method employed is not justified by public policy, and so
supplies the condition to constitute a legal wrong."
"A prudent man may ever conceal from his rival his desire to buy, and
one bargaining for property always does 'so with the knowledge of the
probability that, until he binds the owner by obtaining an option or a
contract, an unknown buyer may intervene, and, without liability to
him, purchase the property'."
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plaintiff to accept $12,500 or later when L told B he would
take the property at $13,500 and B acquiesced. Thus it
would seem that a contract comes into being when a broker
hears that an oral offer has been accepted but no contract
has been signed and no deposit made. This indeed will be
a shock to real estate brokers as pointed out in the dissent-
ing opinion.
In real estate transactions it is not uncommon for the
competition to become heated. An offer to buy can be with-
drawn any time before its acceptance. Acceptance in the
real estate business is customarily made by making a de-
posit with the seller. The haggling over price is only a pre-
liminary leading up to the actual binding contract. As long
as the terms are uncertain and are not reduced to writing,
a binding contract does not exist. The very nature of these
real estate transactions requires that they be reduced to
certainty. Furthermore, contracts for the sale of real prop-
erty must be in writing to be enforceable.' The seller of
real estate will generally continue to have his property on
the market until a deposit is made and a contract is signed.
The seller does not want just an oral promise to purchase,
but wants a deposit to insure a sale.
In Richards, Inc. v. Shearer,9 a suit was brought by a
broker for tortious interference with a real estate contract,
whereby he was deprived of his commission. The court
very carefully reviewed the law and then stated "The diffi-
culty in the appellant's case is not with the law but with
the facts." The evidence failed to prove that a contract had
been established and interference had been shown.
The majority in the instant case in reaching its de-
cision relied heavily on the New York case of Hornstein v.
Podwitz,0 and the Maryland case of Stannard v. McCool."
In the former case, there was no competition but only a con-
spiracy to deprive the broker of his already earned commis-
sion. As summarized by the New York Court of Appeals:
"The complaint herein contains, as amended, all of
the essential allegations necessary in a complaint to re-
cover damages for wrongfully inducing a breach of con-
tract. It sets forth the contract and the fact that the
129 Charles 2, Ch. 3, See. 4, 2 ALEXANDER'S BRITISn STATUTES (Coe's Ed.,
1912) 689; White v. Coombs, 27 Md. 489, 501 (1868) ; Equitable Gas Light
Co. v. Balto. Coal Tar Co., 63 Md. 285, 297 (1885) ; Grauel v. Rohe, 185 Md.
121, 124, 43 A. 2d 201 (1945).
'186 Md. 36, 45 A. 2d 627 (1946).
254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674, 84 A. L. R. 1 (1930).
Supra, n. 6.
1 Supra, n. 10, 675.
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plaintiff had fully performed, and was entitled to the
agreed commissions; that the defendants, with full
knowledge thereof, entered into an agreement to de-
prive the plaintiff of the commissions which he had
earned, and to distribute among themselves a sum of
money in lieu of the commissions and that, in pursu-
ance of the agreement, the owner allowed to the defen-
dants, Mersel and Hirschorn a part of the sum which it
had agreed to pay plaintiff as commissions."
In the latter case, the decision was based on the fact that
the evidence did not show knowledge of a contract.
13
"There being no evidence in this case from which
the jury might reasonably have found that the appellee
had knowledge of the facts which created the twelve
thousand dollar contract or of the contract, entered into
between the appellant and the Nowland heirs, and that
knowledge being essential to a recovery of a judgment
in this case, the trial judge was clearly correct in enter-
ing a judgment N.O.V."
The New York courts have never gone as far as the prin-
cipal case, as can be seen by examining later cases.14
In other jurisdictions, decisions have gone both ways.3
Real estate counsel might feel that in the instant case the
Maryland Court of Appeals should have selected a rule
from these cases more in line with accepted practices in the
real estate business, but the majority chose not to do so.
Today a real estate broker must proceed at his own risk
where he learns of a mere oral acceptance of an offer, de-
spite the fact that no deposit has been received and no
contract signed.
18 Supra, n. 6, 867.
Schulman v. Royal Industrial Bank, 280 App. Div. 401, 113 N. Y. S. 2d
489 (1952) ; Andrews v. Lebis, 279 App. Div. 1013, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 822 (1952) ;
N. A. Berwin & Co. v. American Safety Razor Corp., 108 N. Y. S. 2d 677
(1951) ; Finkelstein v. Kesalp Realty Corp., et al., 107 N. Y. S. 2d 267 (1951),
279 App. Div. 939, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 282 (1952).
15 See notes, 97 A. L. R. 1273 and 146 A. L. R. 1417.
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